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INTRODUCTION
When the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (Antitrust
Division) and the European Commission settled with Microsoft in July
1994, it should have been with a sigh of relief that the case did not have
to go to trial. The Clinton administration had pursued the case to emphasize
its determination to make the information superhighway a reality by
opening up markets and sparking innovation. However, it was really in the
government's best interest to settle, because the current antitrust laws are
inadequate to regulate the emerging high technology industries in the global
economy.
Microsoft had been under fire from its domestic and European
competitors,' legislators, and the federal government since 1990 for its
alleged unfair trade practices2 and possible violations of the Sherman Ace
and the Clayton Act.4 Competitors alleged that Microsoft offered discounts
to personal computer (PC) makers who agreed to pay a license fee for the
use of Microsoft's Disk Operating System (MS-DOS) based on the total
number of PCs they sold, rather than on the number of copies of the
program they made. Competitors also accused Microsoft of introducing
features into some programs that link those programs only to other
Microsoft products, and that the company gave its own applications
program developers information about MS-DOS changes before informing
1. EC Commission Opens Investigation ofMicrosoft's Commercial Conduct, Int'l. Bus.
& Fin. Daily (BNA), Oct. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, BNAIBF File.
2. G. Pascal Zachary, A Winning Deal: Microsoft Will Remain Dominant Despite Pact
in Antitrust Dispute, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1994, at Al.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988).
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its competitors.' Rather than going to trial, the Antitrust Division settled
the case on July 15, 1994.6
The policy issues surrounding the Microsoft case raise serious
questions about the future of antitrust law. International competitiveness
policy, high technology industry analysis, the decline of the computer
industry, and the emergence of the information superhighway should have
driven the settlement agreement with Microsoft, not the failure of antitrust
law to cope with the new problems presented by Microsoft. While the
Antitrust Division might have had the right idea in actively enforcing
antitrust laws to keep markets open, this settlement indicates that perhaps
vigorous enforcement is not always the answer. Microsoft, in fact, can and
should play a leading role in getting the White House's vision of the
information superhighway realized; it could not have been expected to do
so if faced with large fines or the threat of divestiture growing out of an
antitrust action.
This Note will discuss the allegations against Microsoft and the
lawsuit that the Antitrust Division could have brought against Microsoft if
the antitrust laws had kept up with technology. This Note will also evaluate
the competing policy issues that could guide the Antitrust Division in
formulating new policy to use in evaluating allegations against firms like
Microsoft. The Division will have to choose between the differing
viewpoints about antitrust laws regulating competition in order to protect
the United States's international standing.
Regardless of international concerns, enforcing antitrust laws in the
new high technology economy will become increasingly difficult, and the
Antitrust Division needs to reevaluate traditional measures of market power
to better serve U.S. industry as a whole. This difficulty in enforcement has
surfaced in the Microsoft case and will continue as the computer industry
merges into the communications industry on the Information Superhighway.
Finally, this Note will suggest and evaluate some possible changes to the
Antitrust Division's enforcement policy.
5. William tBrandel, Novell and Microsoft Back in the Ring, LAN TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993,
at 10; Wendy Goldman Rohm, Microsoft Rivals Take Tales to Justice Officials, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 23, 1993, § 3, at 3; Louise Keho, The Antitrust Case that Won't Compute: A Look at
FTC's Stalled Probe of Microsoft Practices, FIN. POsT, July 24, 1993, at 43; Brian
Livingston, Could Microsoft's Error Message Be Evidence of Foul Play?, INFOWORLD,
Nov. 22, 1993, at 28; John Markoff, Microsoft Alliances May Limit Probe Damage, S.F.
CHRoN., Aug. 23, 1993, at D2; Microsoft Probe Could Last Years, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25,
1993, at D3; Sandra Sugawara, Microsoft: Hot Rod or Road Hog?, WASH. PosT, Aug. 29,
1993, at Hi; Jonathan Weber, FTC Reported Deadlocked on Microsoft, L.A. TIMES, July
22, 1993, at Dl.
6. Zachary, supra note 2, at Al.
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I. THE ANTITRUST DIVISION'S INVESTIGATION OF MICROSOFT
A. Microsoft's Current Standing
Most computer experts agree that Microsoft sets the desktop standard
for operating systems (OS). 7 When IBM introduced the revolutionary PC
and needed an operating system to translate the applications software
language into computer-recognizable electric impulses, Bill Gates,
Microsoft's chairman and chief executive, took the initiative. He bought an
existing operating system from another company and licensed it to IBM
and then to other PC clones.8 Currently, 80 percent of the PCs in the world
use MS-DOS or Windows,9 a DOS-based operating system that presents
users with a screen of pictorial instructions, rather than DOS codes, as their
operating system."0 Because of Windows and MS-DOS's dominance,
every PC applications software developer in the industry must create
software that is Windows-compatible. Additionally, Microsoft is creating
Windows-based applications of its own. Microsoft has more word
processing software sales than WordPerfect Corp., equals Lotus Develop-
ment Corp. for spreadsheet sales, and is rapidly gaining on Borland
International, Inc. in database sales."
For the past several years, Microsoft has been attacked by competi-
tors, politicians, and recently, the federal government, but so far has come
out relatively unscathed. Microsoft competitors, such as Novell Corp.,
WordPerfect Corp., and Borland International, Inc., have been unsuccessful
in competing against Microsoft and fear for their future." Senators Orrin
Hatch (R-Utah) and Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) joined Microsoft's
competitors to push the government to investigate and take action against
Microsoft for unfair trade practices. 3 Since 1990, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) has investigated allegations against Microsoft, but has
7. The Future of Microsoft: Today Windows, Tomorrow the World, ECONOMIST, May
22, 1993, at 25, 25 [hereinafter Future].
8. Id.
9. Elizabeth Corcoran, Microsoft Settles Case with Justice, WASH. POST, July 17,
1994, at Al.
10. Future, supra note 7, at 25. Windows, strictly speaking, is not an operating system
standing alone. When combined with MS-DOS, however, Windows essentially replaces MS-
DOS from the user's perspective.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See James Coates, Microsoft Avoids FTC Charges, but Case Remains Open, CHI.
TRIB., July 22, 1993, § 3, at 1.
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deadlocked in two separate votes on whether to take action.'4 Senator
Metzenbaum urged FTC Chairwoman Janet Steiger to hand the investiga-
tion over to the Department of Justice, saying, "Anticompetitive practices
that eliminate competition unfairly sap the vitality from that industry and,
ultimately, our economy."' 5 The Antitrust Division, headed by Anne K.
Bingaman, took over the investigation in August 1993 and settled the case
in July 1994.16
B. Allegations Against Microsoft
The Antitrust Division did not investigate Microsoft because of its
large market share, as some analysts suggest. Instead, the Division sought
to determine whether Microsoft had used its monopoly power in the
operating system market to stifle competition and innovation. 7 Ultimately,
the Division charged that Microsoft had indeed used its monopoly power
to exclude competitors and to monopolize related markets through
leveraging."8
1. The Monopolization Charge
The root of the government's potential case against Microsoft was the
claim by competitors that Microsoft used predatory licensing practices by
basing their license fee discounts on the number of PCs sold.' 9 This
prevented PC makers from offering customers alternatives in operating
systems. While Microsoft's licensing practices resulted in decreased costs
to computer makers and decreased prices to consumers, such a practice
effectively shut out other operating system competitors. For example,
Novell Corp. makes one of the only operating system alternatives, DR-
DOS. However, no original equipment manufacturer in the United States
offers DR-DOS, even though the Novell operating system has received
good reviews and has 5 percent of the market outside the United States."
14. Warren Brown, Microsoft to Undergo Justice Dept. Review, WASH. POST, July 31,
1993, at B1.
15. T.C. Doyle, Key Senators Cast Wary Eye on Microsoft-Fair Trade Legislation May
Follow, COMPUTER RESELLER NEWS, Sept. 6, 1993, at 1.
16. Corcoran, supra note 9, at A17.
17. Arthur L. Amolsch, The Microsoft Investigations, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1993, at
A26.
18. See generally Brandel, supra note 5; Goldman Rohm, supra note 5; Keho, supra
note 5; Livingston, supra note 5; Markoff, supra note 5; Sugawara, supra note 5; Weber,
supra note 5.
19. See generally Brandel, supra note 5; Goldman Rohm, supra note 5; Keho, supra
note 5; Livingston, supra note 5; Markoff, supra note 5; Sugawara, supra note 5; Weber,
supra note 5.
20. Sugawara, supra nole 5, at H5.
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The long-term result of this licensing practice is decreased innovation in the
operating system market and possible increased prices.
2. The Leveraging Claims
Additionally, the Antitrust Division investigated allegations that
Microsoft used its market dominance in operating systems to attempt to
monopolize other markets, such as applications software and utilities.2 '
The majority of new PCs today do not use DOS as a stand-alone operating
system. Instead, most run Windows on top of an underlying DOS. Thus, it
is very important to the market success of any DOS product that it be able
to run Windows (and its newer versions) smoothly. Users have found that
error messages appear in Microsoft's Windows when another OS that is not
MS-DOS is used.22 That incompatibility discourages companies from
buying products from OS competitors when they already use Windows.
Indeed, customers faced with such error messages cannot get technical
support from Microsoft. Moreover, many believe that product warranties
may become invalid if competing software is used with Microsoft
products.23
In the applications market, Lotus, WordPerfect, and Borland alleged
that Microsoft used its control over operating system information to better
integrate complementary products, placing applications rivals at a
significant competitive disadvantage.24 Though Microsoft does give out
product information to other applications developers, it gives its own
developers a more complete version of that information first.
C. The Microsoft Settlement
The settlement between the federal government, the European
Commission, and Microsoft came amid a series of abortive negotiations.'
The settlement concentrated on Microsoft's exclusionary licensing practices
and ignored the leveraging claims.26 The settlement stipulates that: (1) PC
makers who have contracts with Microsoft do not have to pay royalties to
Microsoft when they ship hardware with another operating system; (2)
Microsoft cannot require PC makers to pay royalties for a minimum
number of copies; (3) Microsoft will sign only one-year contracts with PC
21. Corcoran, supra note 9, at A17.
22. Livingston, supra note 5, at 28.
23. Id.
24. Zachary, supra note 2, at A12.
25. Elizabeth Corcoran, Microsoft Deal Came Down to a Phone Call, WASH. POST, July
18, 1994, at Al.
26. Corcoran, supra note 9, at A17.
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makers, instead of two- and five-year contracts; and (4) Microsoft will not
force software developers to sign restrictive nondisclosure agreements when
it circulates test copies of its software.'
Many of Microsoft's competitors feel that this decree was a "hollow
victory" for the government, because it had no effect on pricing to
consumers or revenues for Microsoft." The only short-term winner may
be Novell (Microsoft's direct competitor in operating systems), which will
benefit by getting their DR-DOS on the market. However, any benefit for
Novell and any consent decree provisions which address the operating
system market will be a moot point in the next year when Microsoft
introduces its major DOS and Windows upgrade, code-named "Chica-
go."29 One commentator stated that because "there really isn't an
alternative to Windows," most consumers presumably will buy Chicago."
Since those who buy Chicago will automatically get MS-DOS in the
package and will not need DR-DOS, it seems that Novell will once again
be shut out of the operating systems market. The question remains: Should
the Antitrust Division punish Microsoft in this situation because it is
producing a better product than everyone else?
The answer may be "No" in this instance, but the answer might have
been different had the Antitrust Division definitely been able to show that
Microsoft gained market share with anticompetitive intent. Antitrust
Division head Anne Bingaman must have feared that she could not so
easily prove such a case as she stated, "We brought the case that was there
to bring."3' That statement is not an enthusiastic endorsement of the
settlement, but a realistic one. The federal government uses antitrust law to
protect consumers and prevent market monopolization. On the other hand,
the government also aims to enable companies to grow strong enough to
compete effectively in international markets. The Microsoft case, involving
both of these conflicting goals, presented a dilemma. Some say that to
address both problems, the Antitrust Division should strictly enforce the
antitrust laws. While that initially might sound promising, the Microsoft
settlement suggests that strict enforcement was not possible because the
antitrust laws were not suited to evaluating the emerging new markets.
27. Id.
28. Zachary, supra note 2, at Al.
29. Id. at A12. Microsoft has recently planned to delay introduction of its DOS upgrade
(now known as Windows95). IBM has now planned a competitive introduction of its own
upgrade known as "Warp." James Coats, IBM Hits Warp Speed With its New Operating
Systems, Cl. TRm., Oct. 16, 1994, at 5.
30. Id.
31. Viveca Novak, Antitrust's Bingaman Talks Tough on Microsoft Case, WALL ST. J.,
July 17, 1994, at B1.
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IL. THE POTENTIAL ANTITRUST ACTION
A. The Monopolization Case
If the Antitrust Division had gone to trial, it likely would have
asserted monopoly charges against Microsoft for its licensing practices
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolists from
acquiring or maintaining power by blatantly illegal or anticompetitive
acts.3 2 Many commentators, including Microsoft officials, have com-
plained that once U.S. companies become successful, the Antitrust Division
will take away that success. 33 Historically, companies have achieved
success by growing large, often to the detriment of smaller companies.
Although monopoly power is feared both because of its consequences and
its potential for abuse, 34 big does not always mean bad.
The Supreme Court has held that the antitrust laws do not prohibit the
mere operation of monopoly businesses.3 However, such companies
cannot unduly or improperly exercise their monopoly power, and that
power must, as an additional limitation, result from the natural growth of
the company.36 For instance, the Court has held that a Section 2 violation
involves "the willful acquisition or maintenance.of [monopoly] power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historical accident. '37 In a 1979 case, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that certain conduct is illegal
when practiced by a monopolist "because it tends to destroy competition,
although in the hands of a smaller market participant it might be considered
harmless, or even 'honestly industrial.' 3' Therefore, monopolists are held
32. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,
272 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The gravamen of a charge under sec. 1 of the Sherman Act is conduct
in restraint of trade; no fundamental alteration of market structure is necessary.... Section
2, by contrast, is aimed primarily not at improper conduct but at a pernicious market
structure in which the concentration of power saps the salubrious influence of competi-
tion."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
33. Robert S. Stein, Clinton's U-Turn on Antitrust: In Reversing Reagan, Will He
Punish Success?, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Sept. 8, 1993, at 1.
34. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945).
35. Id.
36. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963).
37. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); see Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093
(1980).
38. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275.
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to a stringent standard of conduct whereby monopoly power combined with
willful conduct violates Section 2."
The willful conduct standard requires proof of intent to monopolize:
"[Consideration of intent may play an important role in divining the actual
nature and effect of the alleged anticompetitive conduct."4 The Supreme
Court is less suspicious of internal growth than of growth through
merger4' because there is less of a chance that the intent behind internal
growth is to reduce or suppress competition. The most recent antitrust cases
focus less on intent and more on the effect of, and motivation behind, the
monopolist's challenged acts. For a plaintiff to succeed on a Section 2
claim, the challenged conduct must impair the opportunities of rivals and
"not further competition on the merits or [do] so in an unnecessarily
restrictive way," or "exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency."42
To be illegal, such exclusive conduct must not be justifiable by any
legitimate, pro-competitive business reason.43 Assuming Microsoft has a
monopoly in the operating system market, Microsoft could claim that its
dominance was acquired lawfully through the foresight of Bill Gates in
seeing the potential success of IBM's PC and in producing a superior
operating system for that PC. If this claim was made, intent would once
again become relevant, so that Microsoft's course of conduct would have
to be analyzed as a whole."
When a firm with monopoly power, such as Microsoft, enters into
contractual arrangements with customers with the intent and effect of
forcing those customers to purchase exclusively from the monopolist, courts
might find that the firm violated antitrust laws. Exclusive dealing in this
manner is not fair competition and is not justifiable from an efficiency
standpoint. Therefore, the Antitrust Division might have had a strong claim
39. Id. at 274-76.
40. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978); see
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945) ("In order to fall
within § 2, the monopolist must have both the power to monopolize and the intent to
monopolize.').
41. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963).
42. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985)
(quoting 3 PHrLLip AREEDA & DONALD F. TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAW 626b (1978) and
ROBERT BORK, THE ANTTRUST PARADOX 160 (1978)).
43. Id.
44. See City of Anaheim v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1376 (9th Cir.
1992) ("[lt would not be proper to focus on specific individual acts of an accused
monopolist while refusing to consider their overall combined effect.'); City of Mishawaka
v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976, 986 (7th Cir. 1980) ("The [defendant] would
have us consider each separate aspect of its conduct separately and in a vacuum ... we
might agree... that no one aspect standing alone is illegal. It is the mix of the various
ingredients... in a monopoly broth that produces the unsavory flavor.').
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against Microsoft under the Sherman Act for anticompetitive exclusive
dealing in regard to their licensing practices.
B. The Leveraging Case Necessary to Support the Monopolization
1. Tying Charges
Another option for the Antitrust Division would have been to broaden
the charges against Microsoft to include tying allegations. Tying arrange-
ments---contracts in which the sale of one product is conditioned upon the
sale of a second-are subject to rigorous scrutiny under Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.' This practice
results in
forcing the buyer into taking an unwanted product, the foreclosure of
competitors of the seller from the tied product market, the extension
of market power from the tying product market to the tied product
market[,] ... the reduction of consumer alternatives for purchasing
particular goods, the increase of barriers to entry into both the tied and
tying product markets, and the use of hidden price discrimination in
pricing the ties or the tying product.46
Thus, a firm violates the antitrust laws if: (a) the firm has conditioned the
purchase of one product on the sale of another, (b) a substantial volume of
commerce is foreclosed, (c) the firm has sufficient market power in the
tying market to force purchases in the tied market, and (d) the products
involved are really two separate products.47
The tying charges would have addressed the allegations that Windows
can only be run on MS-DOS. Microsoft's competitors essentially allege that
the company uses its dominance to obtain a monopoly in the applications
software market. Because most PC consumers use Windows, they are
forced to buy software that is compatible with it, which is usually also
marketed by Microsoft.
45. Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits any person engaged in commerce to sell
goods on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the purchaser shall not use or deal
in the goods of a competitor where the effect of such a sale or contract may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1988). Tying arrangements also violate Section I of the Sherman Act, which
prohibits contracts in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
46. Louis B. SCHWARTZ ET AL., ANTITRUST 697-98 (6th ed. 1983) (footnotes omitted).
47. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); see also
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech'l Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
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2. Refusal to Deal and Essential Facility
The government might also have asserted a "refusal to deal" and an
"essential facility" claim against Microsoft. These charges would have
addressed the allegations that Microsoft gave its own applications software
developers information about forthcoming Windows or MS-DOS changes
before it gave the information to other developers.
The Supreme Court has established that the monopolist has no duty
to cooperate with others and that in the vast majority of cases, a monopolist
may "deal with whom he pleases."4 Nevertheless, "[t]he absence of an
unqualified duty to cooperate does not mean that every time a firm declines
to participate in a particular cooperative venture, that decision may not have
evidentiary significance or that it may not give rise to liability in certain
circumstances. '49 Thus, in some circumstances, a monopolist's refusal to
deal with a party seeking business ties may constitute, or be evidence of,
illegal monopolization.
The "essential facilities" approach under Section 2 of the Sherman Act
finds a violation when a monopolist refuses to provide a competitor with
reasonable, non-discriminatory access to some "facility" that is essential to
effective competition.0 The facility essential to competitors in the
Microsoft case is the MS-DOS or Windows technology information. While
this might seem like a worthwhile charge to bring, Microsoft can assert a
legitimate business justification-the desire to reap the benefits from its
technological innovation and research and development investment."' This
defensive response by Microsoft would likely defeat the "essential
facilities" charge.
C. Problems with the Case Against Microsoft
Antitrust Division head Anne Bingaman stated after the settlement
that, in order to win, "you have to have the law and facts" on your side.5"
48. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603 (1985).
49. Id. at 601.
50. MCI Comm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[T]o
establish liability under the essential facilities doctrine [a plaintiff must show]: (1) control
of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or
reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a
competitor, and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891
(1983).
51. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
52. Peter Passell, The Microsoft Case Shows That Trustbusters Won't Be Referees, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 1994, at D2.
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The fact that the parties reached a settlement indicated that one or the other
was missing in the Microsoft case. Because the factual allegations were so
widespread, the deficiency in the federal government's case against
Microsoft must have been applicable law.
First, the antitrust laws allow a monopolist to defend its actions
through economic justifications.53 For example, Microsoft could have
claimed that it should be able to take advantage of its technological
innovations without providing the specifications of MS-DOS or Windows
to competitors. This defense is easy for Microsoft to assert, but difficult for
the government to disprove.
Furthermore, proof of monopolization hinges on market share which,
in turn, hinges on market definition. The government likely had trouble
identifying Microsoft's market share in software applications markets. In
order to identify a firm with monopoly power, the government investigates
excess profits made by the firm, monopoly conduct, and the overall market
structure. 4 In the Microsoft case, the government could find excess profits
and some evidence of leveraging through the competitors' allegations.
Establishing Microsoft's market share in the numerous software segments,
however, created a weakness in the government's case.
Microsoft does have a substantial market share in operating systems,
but to substantiate the monopolization case, the government would have to
show that Microsoft had anticompetitive intent proven through instances of
leveraging or refusing to deal. Furthermore, to substantiate the leveraging
claims, the government would need evidence of high market shares in the
software markets. However, market definition of Microsoft's markets is
problematic. Therefore, in order to show high market share in software, the
Antitrust Division would have had to define the markets narrowly,
potentially leading to an inaccurate picture as to the market power that
Microsoft wields.
III. GLOBALIZATION AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL
REVOLUTION-THE INADEQUACY OF ANTITRUST LAW
As world markets open to American products and the domestic
economy merges with a global one, the role of domestic antitrust policy
becomes clouded." The United States leads the world in technology,
especially in the fields of microprocessors, supercomputers, software, and
53. See Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d 263.
54. STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 37-39 (1993).
55. See Louis A. Schapiro, The Role of Intellectual Property Protection and
International Competitiveness, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (1989).
[Vol. 47
MICROSOFT
telecommunications, because of vigorous competition and innovation in
U.S. markets. 6 President Clinton recognized that "America's economic
performance and international influence rest in large part on its technology
base."57 He favored an activist approach in his campaign platform wherein
the government would promote the development of industrial technolo-
gy
58
Many think Microsoft is the model for such international competitive-
ness because it sets the industry standard in the operating system market
worldwide. 9 Additionally, Microsoft sparked domestic innovation by
inspiring the creation of 500 companies in the United States to write
software for Microsoft's Windows and currently involving 16,000
companies in creating more compatible software.6 ° However, others
maintain that Microsoft both dominates certain markets and shuts out some
domestic competitors.
6
'
A. The Transformation of the Computer Industry
High technology industries are driven today by small, innovative
companies. Although Microsoft appears to be as large as IBM once was,
it is not. Companies that are succeeding in the new economy-e.g.,
Microsoft, Novell, and Intel-have done so by moving horizontally, rather
than yertically.6 1 Vertically-integrated giants (like IBM) that produced
every component of their product in the early days of computing are not
successful today in the high technology marketplaces. Microsoft has
succeeded because it is structured like a small company, employing many
different product developers instead of a huge managerial hierarchy. Thus,
it is able to sell low-cost, high-profit PC hardware and software through the
fast-growing distribution network, rather than through the monolithic
internal infrastructures of the old days.63 This change is due to the nature
56. Id.; Michael Schrage, Challenge of the '90s: Maintaining U.S. High-Technology
Leadership, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1993, at C8.
57. Dan Southerland, Restoring the Innovation Edge, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1992, at
DlI.
58. Id.
59. Growing Pains at Microsoft, FIN. TIMES, July 26, 1993, at 19.
60. Sugawara, supra note 5, at H5; see generally Keho, supra note 5.
61. Sugawara, supra note 5, at H5.
62. Andy Grove, How Intel Makes Spending Pay Off, FORTUNE, Feb. 22, 1993, at 56,
56.
63. Id. at 57-58.
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of the computer industry where innovation, rather than efficiency, drives
production.6
Since the computer industry is fusing with other technologies,
companies like Microsoft are able to spread out from core businesses to
follow the innovation trends. Presently, Microsoft has captured nearly 40
percent of the $8 billion PC software industry 65 and 80 percent of the
operating system market share.6 In 1992, Microsoft had less than 50
percent of its sales in applications software and, a year later, software
comprised over an estimated 60 percent of its annual sales. 7 Applications
software will take most of Microsoft's resources for research, development,
and marketing, as price wars begin to heat up.68 Nevertheless, the
applications market appears to be saturated because three-fourths of
applications sales are upgrades of existing products.69
The desktop standard market is only growing at a 5 percent annual
rate7° and, presumably, Microsoft's growth rate has declined as a result.
Where the company used to double every two years, it now grows at only
a 20 to 25 percent annual rate7' and expects slower growth in PC sales
during the last half of 1994 and the first half of 1995.72 In order to find
profits and escape the saturated software market, Microsoft is exploring
new markets, while avoiding the vertical integration that has plagued
IBM.73
According to many analysts, the computer market will change
drastically as computer and communications technologies merge. The
merger between cable and telephone companies points "the way to the
convergence of the $20-billion (annual revenue) cable industry with the
$80-billion telephone industry and the $150-billion computer industry." 4
Following this trend or perhaps forecasting it, Microsoft has begun to move
64. See Anthony L. Clapes, Blinded by the Light: Antitrust Analysis of Computer
Industry Alliances, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 899 (1993).
65. Thomas McCarroll, Ending the Paper Chase, TIME, June 14, 1993, at 60, 65.
66. Corcoran, supra note 9, at 26.
67. Future, supra note 7, at 26.
68. Id.
69. G. Christian Hill, Microsoft Discloses Stunning Growth to Analysts but Warns It Is
at Risk, WALL ST. J., July 25, 1994, at B2; see also Markoff, supra note 5, at D2.
70. Barbara Darrow, Bill Gates, COMPUTER RESELLER NEWS, Nov. 15, 1993, at 154.
71. Paul Andrews, Microsoft's Boss Turns 38, Still Confounding Skeptics, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Oct. 31, 1993, at Hll.
72. Hill, supra note 69, at B2.
73. Future, supra note 7, at 26.
74. James Flanigan, Bell Atlantic Finds Its Calling, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1993, at Dl.
Although this particular deal fell through, the theory behind combining cable and
telecommunications companies still applies.
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resources to form joint ventures to produce communications equipment. As
the growth rates in operating systems and the existing applications software
markets slowly decline due to innovations in other areas, Microsoft is
diversifying into areas such as networks and the emerging Information
Superhighway---"a seamless web of communications networks, computers,
databases, and consumer electronics that will put vast amounts of
information at users' fingertips."'  Microsoft is not limited to any one
market segment, and its market share cannot be easily evaluated for any
one product because it is always moving ahead to new products as old
markets decline. Currently, antitrust policy does not fit this type of growth
and should change to better fit the characteristics of these changing
industries.
B. Antitrust Policy and the International Economy
Members of the Clinton administration believe that vigorous antitrust
enforcement is essential to sparking innovation and strengthening
companies that can compete effectively at home and abroad. Vice President
Gore has said, "U.S. preeminence in computers, telecommunications and
biotech is a direct result of active government intervention. 7 6 Enforce-
ment of antitrust policy theoretically stimulates competition, expands
innovation, and thus, would keep the United States as the world leader in
computer technology.
Ernest H. Preeg, trade expert at the Center for International &
Strategic Studies and a former U.S. ambassador, agrees with Anne
Bingaman that "[a] more forceful domestic strategy to stimulate continued
technological innovation is clearly in order if the United States is to remain
at the technological forefront over the longer term."77 At a hearing before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, Robert Pitofsky, a Georgetown University
law professor, also recognized that antitrust law should become globalized,
but asserted that the best way to do that was to "enforce the antitrust law
more vigorously and as Congress intended."" Professor Pitofsky mitigates
this position by adding that the government should recognize certain
75. Vice President Al Gore's Speech on Telecommunications Policy, Delivered Jan. 11
in Los Angeles to Academy of Television Arts and Sciences, Along with White House
Background Paper and Statement on "Telecommunications Policy Reform, " Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA) at M-8 (Jan. 12, 1994) [hereinafter Background Paper].
76. Schrage, supra note 56, at C8.
77. Ernest H. Preeg, Who's Benefiting Whom? A Trade Agenda for High-Technology
Industries, WASH. Q., Autumn 1993, at 17, 25.
78. National Economic Strategies for a Global Economy: Hearings Before Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1992) (testimony of Robert Pitofsky,
Professor of Law, Georgetown Univ.).
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efficiency defenses so as to encourage more joint ventures, which lead to
innovative research and development.79
Anne Bingaman hails from the Democratic school of antitrust
enforcement, which uses government as a tool to protect consumers from
unfair business practices."0 Bingaman advocates vigorous antitrust
enforcement, including strict merger review and a presumption of illegality
on the side of business in antitrust violations."' According to Bingaman,
this philosophy is not detrimental to international competition but, in fact,
is essential: "It is precisely because the United States is faced with strong
foreign rivals that we need vigorous antitrust enforcement ... "82 Many
theorists support Bingaman, including George Washington University's
antitrust expert, Thomas Morgan, who states that "[a] vigorous competitive
marketplace at home is essential to the production of firms that are able to
be effective in the global marketplace .... In that sense, strict enforcement
is more important."83 Strict enforcement may well be the best way to
protect international competition, but as the Microsoft settlement shows,
strict enforcement of current antitrust laws will not work in the new
computer industry and the high technology information superhighway
industries.
C. High Technology Industries and Market Analysis
Concern about antitrust policy and international competitiveness is
compounded by the transformation of the global economy through the
information and technological revolution. Many experts think that this high
technology international economy demands a new kind of antitrust
analysis. 4 High technology markets do not fit into the traditional antitrust
law's relevant market definition and market-power measurements.
Antitrust law measures monopoly power by narrowly defining the
relevant market and then determining the monopolist's share of that market.
In high technology industries, one innovative product can make up an
entire market. However, the small producer does not truly control a
substantial share of the industry, because another innovator can easily
displace the first with a new product. Consequently, innovation, rather than
market share, determines market power. Thus, market power becomes
79. Id. at 23-24.
80. Stein, supra note 33, at 2.
81. Sandra Sugawara, The 'Outsider' as Antitrust Chief- Probe of Microsoft Symbolizes
Anne Bingaman's Activist Course, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1993, at H1, H4.
82. Id.
83. Stein, supra note 33, at 2.
84. See W. John Moore, Rough Ride, 25 NAT'L J. 2874, 2874 (1993).
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harder to measure under traditional antitrust law analysis. Important
technological improvements can catapult a small firm to the top of the
market for a short time. That firm's market share potential may never be
realized, however, because the next innovation may be more powerful,
allowing a new company to take over the market."
Microsoft has successful staying power even within this market
structure because it constantly moves to new markets while profits are
fresh, leaving the old markets behind. Usually, new information markets are
dominated by a single firm with an innovative product. One innovation,
such as Windows, creates opportunities for more new products that are
designed to work with the first product. As more applications are developed
for new software or hardware, the firm's market expands quickly. However,
this means that the old leader's market power collapses just as rapidly. As
a result, the traditional measure of market power-market share-does not
fully take into account the dynamics of the computer industry.86
Robert Shapiro, a former Clinton economic advisor, also notes the
problems of antitrust enforcement in the high technology industries of the
new economy: "In global competition, a firm's capacity to innovate is fast
becoming more important than its ability to cut costs by being more
efficient."87 In an industry such as computers, small firms flourish in such
an industry because "a firm with an innovative product or process can
overtake the industry leader without matching its scale."8 Shapiro adds
that in such an industry, the number of competitors is not a good measure
of a firm's standing because innovative products create their own markets
with one firm dominating for a short time. However, the barriers to entry
into the market are slight because innovation is based on "human resources
that no firm can monopolize." 9
Since the government is concerned with establishing technological
superiority in a global market, Microsoft is essential to the functioning of
the computer industry at present. Shapiro further stated: "Curbing the leader
in one segment of this well-functioning industry at the behest of the
leader's lagging rivals, would, in effect, subsidize firms that have not
85. See Edmund L. Andrews, Clinton and Technology: Some Policies Clash, N.Y.
TiMES, Apr. 11, 1994, at Dl.
86. See generally Clapes, supra note 64, at 899 (explaining the unusual market structure
of innovative industries).
87. Robert J. Shapiro, One World Under DOS?, WASH. PosT, Nov. 14, 1993, at C2.
Robert Shapiro is vice president of the Progressive Policy Institute. He was a principal
economic advisor to Clinton's 1992 presidential campaign.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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competed as successfully and so weaken all players' economic incentives
for innovation."9
Because of the nature of the industry, the Antitrust Division should
be careful not to overstate firms' power in the markets in question. This is
not to say that strict enforcement has not been good for competition in the
past; however, the new economy is very different and requires a new
antitrust analysis. "[T]he increasing role of computer technology in
previously distinct businesses-such as consumer electronics, telecommuni-
cation, publishing, entertainment, and education-is blurring the boundaries
of the computer industry. That blurring makes market definition in the
computer industry increasingly problematical."'"
Strict enforcement of the antitrust laws can work to promote
competition, but they should be tempered by policy considerations that look
at the broader economy to see where strict enforcement is best suited. The
policy behind the information superhighway suggests that Microsoft was
not a likely candidate for strict enforcement. The information superhighway
and Microsoft's place on it are becoming a reality. With the advent of
integrated communications industries and the complicated structure that
accompanies this trend, the Antitrust Division should reevaluate its
competition policy. More importantly, the Division should consider long-
term global communications development in its analysis. The United
States's future in the global economy depends on technology innovation;
90. Id.
91. Clapes, supra note 64, at 909. The current positions of AT&T and IBM offer a
good comparison between the approaches of strict enforcement and laissez-faire. AT&T
faced divestiture in the 1980s based on the results of a governmental investigation but still
remains a formidable telecommunications company, especially with its recently approved
merger with McCaw Cellular. See Mary Lu Carnevale, AT&T, U.S. Sign Antitrust Pact to
Let McCaw Purchase Proceed with Limits, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1994, at A4. Whereas, at
the breakup, AT&T's total stock value was worth $47.5 billion, today the total stock value
from the eight spinoffs is $180 billion. Jon Van, A Personal Look into the Framework of
IBM's Failures, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1993, § 7, at 3 (reviewing PAUL CARROLL, BIG
BLUES: THE UNMAKING OF IBM (1993)). In contrast, IBM made it through an eight-year
investigation without facing divestiture but is now facing serious decline anyway. IBM went
from a company with $34 billion in stock value in 1982 to only $25 billion today. Id.
Perhaps IBM could have done better if the government had split it up; IBM could have
disposed of its unwieldy vertical infrastructure and restructured to become more competitive
in today's innovative computer industry. It is interesting to note that in February 1993, IBM
announced its intention to "eliminate layers of its vaunted direct sales infrastructure built
during the computer giant's mainframe days," although it seems as if this move might be
too little, too late. The Year in Review: February, 1993, COMPUTER RESELLER NEWS, Nov.
15, 1993, at 353.
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that future lies in the information distribution market where communica-
tions is "becoming an entirely new medium."92
IV. MICROSOFT'S PLACE ON THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY
A. U.S. Regulatory Policy and the National Information
Infrastructure
The information market requires the collapse of industry boundaries
as computer, telecommunications, and cable companies join together to
provide the information infrastructure that includes "wireless voice and data
phones; cellular and personal communications systems (PCS); connected
notebook computers and personal digital assistants (PDAs); conferencing
phones using voice, data, and video; and server farms with video quality
information integrated into intelligent broadband networks."'93 As Vice
President Gore noted, the "new marketplace will no longer be divided along
current sectoral lines . ... Everyone will be in the bit business. The
functions provided will define the marketplace." 94Computer companies
such as Microsoft provide the software to link these technologies.
The federal government cannot afford to subsidize this burgeoning
industry.95 It will be up to private investment to lay the foundation for the
superhighway. However, the Clinton administration recognizes that the
government needs to serve as catalyst and coordinator of the entire
effort.96 Government involvement will help the U.S. gain a stronger
foothold in the global market: "[B]y taking the lead in quickly employing
these new information technologies, America's businesses will gain
enormous advantages in the worldwide marketplace."97 In order to
accelerate the development of the technology and to ensure access to the
highway for the rich and the poor alike, the administration must remove
some of the immense legal and regulatory barriers so private investment
can increase.
In order to provide a conducive environment for development, the
Clinton administration has been slowly unveiling its National Information
92. Paul Saffo, Looking Ahead to the Next Decade, COMM. WEEK, Jan. 3, 1994, at 52,
52.
93. John Sculley, Keynote Presentation at the Networked Economy Conference (Oct.
20, 1993), in 11 MULTIMEDIA & VIDEODISC MONITOR, Nov. 1993.
94. Vice President Al Gore, Remarks at the Television Academy at UCLA (Jan. 11,
1994) (copy on file with the Federal Communications Law Journal) [hereinafter Gore].
95. See Alexandra M. Biesada, Paving the Digital Superhighway, UNIXWORLD, Dec.
1993, at 58, 59.
96. Id.
97. Gore, supra note 94.
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Infrastructure (NII) initiative, where "the marketplace must offer opportuni-
ty and the ability to compete" and the government establishes protocols,
standards, and regulatory policies while letting the private sector do the
rest.98 The NII includes various legislative proposals, such as the National
Information Infrastructure Act of 1993 (popularly called the Boucher Bill),
and the High Performance Computing and Communications (HPCC)
Program, which are designed to "spur the development of the applications"
and "advanced computing and communications technologies" that will be
available over the superhighway.99
By encouraging competition, the government hopes to increase
investment.'00 However, the existing regulatory structures may not
adequately foster the kind of competition the communications industry
needs to spur the growth of the information superhighway. Vice President
Gore outlined the problem of market definition in these new high
technology industries. "Even if the lines between industries and markets
were clear in the past, technological and market changes are now blurring
them beyond recognition, if not erasing them entirely. Regulatory policies
predicated on such perceived distinctions can harm consumers by impeding
competition and discouraging private investment in networks and
services."'' Thus, the administration is seeking "gradual deregulation...
as it clears the path for a future 'information superhighway' ... ."102
With the advent of new regulatory schemes for the industries involved
in the information superhighway, the Antitrust Division needs to reformu-
late antitrust enforcement guidelines so that the guidelines both protect high
technology industries through strict enforcement and encourage private
investment. Companies with large amounts of capital, such as Microsoft,
must be persuaded to provide the funding for the superhighway. Therefore,
the government cannot afford to support or enact regulations that attack
such pivotal companies. The government will have a challenge in
determining which markets have to be watched closely and which need to
be left alone. However, the companies contributing to the information
superhighway most likely will be the innovative companies like Microsoft;
98. Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown, Remarks at the Museum of Television
and Radio 2 (Jan. 6, 1994) (copy on file with the Federal Communications Law Journal).
99. Biesada, supra note 95, at 60.
100. Id.
101. Background Paper, supra note 75, at M-5.
102. Administration Backs Gradual Deregulation of Cable, Telephone Services, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA) at A-7 (Dec. 22, 1993). For more information about the
administration's plans for regulatory reform, see Gore, supra note 94.
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these companies can move quickly into emerging markets and will not
linger in any one market long enough to monopolize it.
B. Microsoft's New Markets
The future world economy is based on networks and communications
technology. The fast-moving companies that can capitalize on these
developments will succeed in laying the highway framework and escape
government scrutiny. In keeping with the trend, Microsoft has introduced
an office software system that relies on Windows and connects computers,
phones, copiers, fax machines, and printers into a digital web for conve-
nient exchange of information. 3 To accomplish this, Microsoft has
formed alliances with companies such as Hewlett-Packard, Compaq, and
Northern Telecom.°4 Microsoft has recorded a 130 percent surge in sales
of its office software system.0'0
The big news, however, is Microsoft's current research and develop-
ment efforts ($100 million a year) for the information superhighway. 0 6
Microsoft has recently boosted its expenditures 20 percent from thd
previous quarter and 36 percent from the fourth quarter in 1992 for
research and development in interactive cable TV and personal communica-
tions systems. 07 Bill Gates wants to provide the links between cable and
telephone technologies, which could potentially determine the face of
interactive communications. Moreover, analysts predict that "[t]here will be
a growing business for companies that can generate new information and
programming for the system."'0 8
Other joint ventures included a partnership with Compaq to design a
product combining a notebook computer, fax, and phone with Windows
software. 9 Additionally, Microsoft has a deal with Intel Corp. and
General Instruments to produce cable TV converters to allow cable
subscribers to use interactive multimedia services and software. Intel and
Microsoft are joining up again to propose another product, which would
integrate the user's PCS and telephone."0 Bill Gates also has steered
Microsoft into the CD-ROM market (a $325 million market in 1993),
103. McCarroll, supra note 65, at 60.
104. Id.
105. Hill, supra note 69, at B2.
106. Andrews, supra note 71, at Hll; Darrow, supra note 70, at 154.
107. Tony Bove & Cheryl Rhodes, Microsoft Guards its Window Seat From Foes, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 3, 1993, § 20, at 10.
108. Flanigan, supra note 74, at Dl.
109. Future, supra note 7, at 27.
110. Id.
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which is expected to reach $1 billion by the end of 1996."' Microsoft
ranks fourth in this field with products including an interactive movie guide
and a CD-ROM encyclopedia with video clips, still images, and sound;
both are priced to appeal to consumers with average incomes."2
Microsoft also aims to capture the software market for information
distribution. Although it has an advantage in its existing distribution
network, Microsoft will not be able to dominate that market as easily as it
did the operating system market." 3 In the information content business,
as in books or records, "people want to buy a lot of different things from
a lot of sources."".4 In this field, emerging industries will be very
competitive. Because innovation will play a greater role than efficiencies,
market leaders will come and go. Additionally, brand loyalty does not
really exist in the information business as it does in the computer industry
because information, not equipment, is the commodity." 5 Joint ventures
are going to be the only way for companies to efficiently invest in research
and development because of the reduced risk and cost for the parties
involved. With so many strategic alliances, no one player will easily
dominate a particular market.
Microsoft has joined in private industry's efforts to work with the
government to lay the foundation for the Superhighway. The "Cross-
Industry Working Team" (XIWT), a cross section of the providers of NII
technologies from several key information industries including AT&T,
MCI, Bell Atlantic, TCI, and Apple," 6 is designed to develop common
technological approaches to bridge research efforts from different industries,
plan pilot projects, create a dialogue among participants from private and
public sectors, and organize technology forums to discuss research results
and disseminate information."7
Microsoft is a big player on the information superhighway because it
has more capital to invest in research and development than most of the
small companies making up the new computer market, and it is quick to
move in on new investments. The government's best interests were served
by leaving Microsoft alone at this time, but it is too early to say that
another company following Microsoft's example will be so important that
111. Laurie Flynn, Now, Microsoft Wants to Gather Information, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5,
1994, at Dl.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Future, supra note 7, at 27.
116. Heather Clancy, Information Superhighway Moves Closer to Reality, COMPUTER
RESELLER NEWS, Dec. 20, 1993, at 22.
117. Id.
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it should be shielded from strict enforcement. The Microsoft case illustrated
that if the government had needed to stop Microsoft completely, it could
not have done so under current antitrust law.
V. POLICY CHANGES FOR ANTITRUST LAW IN HIGH-TECH
INDUSTRIES
One commentator has argued that "the current restrictive approach to
market definition leads to overenforcement because agencies fail to account
for the full range of restraints on market power" when they are investigat-
ing high technology industries."' Therefore, a solution to high technology
market anomalies could be to look at a broader market, perhaps the whole
industry, in order to accurately consider the impact of competing and
compatible products, and calculate market concentration considering the
interaction of products in the industry." 9 Exploring a broader definition
of the market at issue would also alleviate problems in determining market
power based on market share. For example, an alleged monopolist may
have 100 percent of the market share in a product market, but have very
little power to cause an increase in that product's price in the entire
industry. Measuring market power based on the market share of the broader
relevant market might be a better indicator of the power of a particular firm
to affect the communications industry as a whole.
Another possibility for regulating high technology industries such as
the computer industry is to require companies to produce products that are
compatible with all others. In high technology industries, compatibility is
necessary for successful products. Because programs are licensed, firms
cannot reverse engineer many products to make them compatible. MS-DOS
and Windows are truly essential facilities for the software industry.
Therefore, the Antitrust Division should require Microsoft to test its MS-
DOS with all applications software and give applications software
developers the information they need to make their applications compati-
ble. 2 ' If all the systems and software were compatible, consumers could
select which to use, and, presumably, the market would be competitive.
While "[w]ithholding from others advance knowledge of one's new
products ... ordinarily constitutes valid competitive conduct," '21 in this
118. Corcoran, supra note 25, at Al.
119. See id.
120. See generally Scott McNealy, Window(s) on Monopoly, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1994,
at A10 (arguing that "U.S. antitrust law has failed to keep up with the pace of technolo-
gy.').
121. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
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case, that standard does not apply. When one company has a monopoly in
an industry standard, like MS-DOS, the company must be forced to
communicate more extensively with its applications software develop-
ers.' Requiring compatibility might alleviate these problems. This
solution also suggests that a broader market definition is in order because
it would take into account an entire system (operating systems and
software), rather than one or the other.
CONCLUSION
Given the unique nature of the emerging multimedia industry and the
unique role that Microsoft is playing within that industry, it was just-and
fortunate-that the government had only partial success in its case against
Microsoft. Unless Congress and the Antitrust Division reformulate the
antitrust law to address the realities of the marketplace, it will be difficult
to check unfair practices in the future. The government has a strong interest
in deregulating the new information industries and must work to develop
a competition policy that will allow for strict enforcement when it is
needed and leniency where it is necessary.
122. See generally Livingston, supra note 5, at 28.
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